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In cases where a complete and adequate remedy at law exists,
the six-year Statute of Limitations is applicable' and the time can-
not be enlarged 2 by proceeding in equity under the ten-year statu-
tory period.3 When the jurisdiction of equity has been challenged
because of an alleged adequate remedy available at law, courts have
held that such adequate remedy deprives the plaintiff of relief in
equity. 4 But where the relief sought in equity is challenged 5 because
of an alleged outlawing of the action in that the remedy at law was
not utilized for- six years, the courts hold that the remedy or relief
at law must be an affirmative one in order for the six-year period
to apply. 6 The rule is well established that the Statute of Limita-
tions does not apply to defenses at law; 7 the purpose of the Statute
of Limitations is to establish a period within which a cause of action
in law or in equity must be prosecuted. Thus, the remedy at law
being only a defense, there is no limitation to apply in equity other
than the proper ten-year limitation period. The court in the instant
case followed the above reasoning though basing its decision largely
on its reluctance to further limit the application of the ten-year limi-
tation by denying equity jurisdiction because a defense at law had
been available for six years.
A. O'D.
REAL PROPERTY-RECORDING AcT-BURDEN OF PRooF.-Plain-
tiff's grantor unconditionally executed a deed to plaintiff and delivered
it in escrow, to take effect upon grantor's death. This deed was not
IN. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 48: "any action to procure a judgment on the
grounds of fraud must be commenced within six years after the cause of
action has accrued."
'Rundle v. Allison, 34 N. Y. 180 (1866); Keys v. Leopold, 213 App.
Div. 760, 210 N. Y. Supp. 406 (lst Dept. 1925), rev'd on other grounds,
241 N. Y. 189, 149 N. E. 828 (1925).
' N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 53: "an action, the limitation of which is not
specifically prescribed in this article must be commenced within ten years
after the cause of action accrues." See also Dodds v. McColgan, 125 Misc.
405, 211 N. Y. Supp. 371 (1925); Ford v. Clendenin, 155 App. Div. 433, 137
N. Y. Supp. 54 (2d Dept. 1911); Gilmore v. Ham, 142 N. Y. 1, 36 N. E.
826 (1911); Pitcher et al. v. Sutton, 238 App. Div. 291, 264 N. Y. Supp.
488 (4th Dept. 1933); Clarke v. Gilmore, 149 App. Div. 445, 133 N. Y.
Supp. 1047 (1st Dept. 1912).
'Town of Venice v. Woodruff, 62 N. Y. 462, 20 A. L. R. 495 (1895);
Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. McCarthy, 245 App. Div. 784,
280 N. Y. Supp. 948 (3d Dept. 1935); New York Life Insurance Co. v.
Sisson, 19 F. (2d) 410 (W. D. Pa. 1926).
'As in the instant case, the sole defense of the Statute of Limitations
concedes that equity has jurisdiction but alleges that the action is barred.
Bidiwell & Banta v. Astor Mutual Insurance Co., 16 N. Y. 263 (1857).
'Clarke v. Boorman's Executors, 85 U. S. 493, 21 L. ed. 904 (1875);
Pattir v. Walker, 159 Misc. 339, 287 N. Y. Supp. 806 (1936).
'Maders v. Lawrence, 49 Hun 360, 2 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1888); People
v. Faxon, 111 Misc. 699, 182 N. Y. Supp. 242 (1920).
RECENT DECISIONS
recorded. Subsequently the grantor conveyed the same property to
defendant who took without notice of the prior deed. Defendant
recorded his deed. When the grantor died, plaintiff instituted this
action to cancel the recorded deed. Plaintiff proved the validity of
his deed and relied on the proposition that the recital of "One dollar
and other valuable consideration" in defendant's deed was not suffi-
cient to make the subsequent purchaser a "purchaser for value" under
the Recording Act.' Defendant produced no evidence of considera-
tion other than the recital in the deed. Held, that under the Record-
ing Act, where the subsequent deed does not recite a consideration
sufficient to satisfy the Act, the subsequent purchaser has the burden
of proving, by a fair preponderance of evidence that he has paid a
valuable consideration. Hood v. Webster, 291 N. Y. 57, 2 N. E.
(2d) 43 (1936).
It is well settled in New York, that the grantee who claims under
a prior unrecorded deed is required to prove that the subsequent pur-
chaser of record took with notice.2 Similarly, the prior grantee is
required to prove, if he asserts it, that the junior purchaser did not
pay a valuable consideration. The burden of proving these issues is
upon the prior purchaser,3 but the burden of producing evidence may
be shifted to the subsequent purchaser.4 In the instant case the sub-
sequent purchaser's deed is of no value unless protected by the Re-
cording Act ' but it devolves upon the prior purchaser to prove that
the subsequent purchaser does not come within the provisions of the
statute. The courts, in construing the Recording Act, hold that the
consideration must not only be good, but valuable in the sense that
a fair equivalent is given for the property granted in order to consti-
tute the subsequent grantee a purchaser for value.6  The recital in
" N. Y. REAL PRop. LAW, § 291: "Every conveyance of real property not
recorded is void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a
valuable consideration from the same vendor, his heir or devisees, of the same
real property or any portion thereof, whose conveyance is first duly recorded."2 Brown v. Volkening, 64 N. Y. 76 (1876); Constant v. University of
Rochester, 111 N. Y. 604, 19 N. E. 631 (1889); Gratz v. Land and River Im-
provement Co., 82 Fed. 381 (C. C. A. 7th, 1897).
aGratz v. Land and River Improvement Co., 82 Fed. 381 (C. C. A. 7th,
1897) (In the state of New York it is ruled that under the Recording Act the
junior purchaser-whose deed is first recorded is presumptively a bona fide pur-
chaser for a valuable consideration, without notice-and the burden of proof
to the contrary rests upon the prior purchaser-whose deed has not been re-
corded.). But see Ten Eyck v. Witbeck, 135 N. Y. 40, 31 N. E. 994 (1892)
and Lehrenkrauss v. Bonnell, 199 N. Y. 240, 243, 92 N. E. 637, 638 (1910).
'Brody v. Pecoraro, 250 N. Y. 56, 164 N. E. 741 (1928); Ten Eyck v.
Witbeck, 135 N. Y. 40, 31 N. E. 994 (1892); Lehrenkrauss v. Bonnell, 199
N. Y. 240, 92 N. E. 637 (1910) ; THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
(1898) pp. 353-389.
Saltzeider v. Saltzeider, 219 N. Y. 523, 114 N. E. 86 (1916); Seymour
v. McKinstry, 106 N. Y. 230, 14 N. E. 94 (1887); Fleckinger v. Glass, 222
N. Y. 404, 118 N. E. 972 (1918).
'Ten Eyck v. Witbeck, 135 N. Y. 40, 46, 31 N. E. 994, 995 (1892) (One
who acquires title to valuable property for a merely nominal money considera-
tion, although actually paid, but under circumstances indicating a gift or ad-
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the deed of "one dollar and other valuable consideration" is not suffi-
cient to put him in this position.7 Thus the prior grantee by estab-
lishing that the junior grantee is not protected by the Recording Act,
compels the subsequent grantee to produce further evidence of con-
sideration to bring himself within the meaning of "a purchaser for
a valuable consideration" under the statute.
Likewise, the burden ofproducing evidence is upon the. holder
of the unrecorded deed, when the subsequent deed, first recorded,
acknowledges receipt of consideration sufficient to satisfy the Record-
ing Act." In this instance, as in the preceding one, the prior grantee
must show, if he asserts it, that the subsequent grantee took with
notice. Although the subsequent grantee meets the requirements of
the Recording Act, if the prior purchaser shows that a fraud has been
perpetrated upon him by the grantor, the burden of producing evi-
dence then shifts to the subsequent purchaser who must prove that
he had no knowledge of the fraud and that he purchased for a valu-
able consideration. 9 In this instance (where a fraud has been perpe-
trated by the grantor), the proof of a substantial payment by the sub-
sequent grantee, is held to be more than evidence of a valuable
consideration-it is construed as an inference of a purchase without
notice. 10 The burden of adducing evidence to offset this inference
then shifts to the prior purchaser.
E. O. C.
ToRTs-NuIANcE-LIABILITY OF LESSOR AND SUB-LESSEE FOR
WRONGFUL ACT OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.-Defendant Gotham
Silk Hosiery Co. was lessee of an entire building at 34th Street and
Broadway, New York City. Five large signboards were affixed to
the sides and on the roof of the building. Two of these signs were
leased to defendant Strauss & Co., which was engaged in the sign
advertising business. Plaintiff was seriously injured when one end
of a scaffold, which was insecurely suspended from said building, gave
vance is not, within the meaning of the Recording Act, a purchaser for valu-
able consideration and his deed, although recorded, conveys no title as against
a prior unrecorded conveyance of the same property. The consideration must
not only be good, but valuable, in the sense that a fair equivalent is given for
the property granted, in order to constitute the grantee a purchaser for value.).
Lehrenkrauss v. Bonnell, 199 N. Y. 240, 92 N. E. 637 (1910).
'Wood v. Chopin, 13 N. Y. 509 (1856); Page v. Waring, 76 N. Y. 63
(1882).
'Brody v. Pecoraro, 250 N. Y. 56, 164 N. E. 741 (1928) (Where the
proof shows a fraud has been perpetrated, by the grantor, the burden of evi-
dence is shifted upon one who claims to be an innocent purchaser to show that
he acquired the property without any knowledge or notice that would put him
upon inquiry and for a full and adeauate consideration.).
"Brown v. Volkening, 64 N. Y. 76 (1876); Constant v. University of
Rochester, 111 N. Y. 604, 19 N. E. 631 (1889).
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